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We develop and calibrate an empirical model within a Hotelling-Ricardo framework to study the 
adoption and rate of diffusion of biofuels for transportation use and the implications of this. We 
include both first and second-generation biofuels. The model is global and considers land allocation 
(Ricardo) as well as the scarcity of petroleum resources (Hotelling). Within this framework, we 
analyze the effects of mandatory blending in the United States and the European Union on world 
agricultural and energy markets, and on carbon emissions. We find that the effect of the mandatory 
blending policies on food production and food prices is smaller than found in previous studies. 
Furthermore, by taking into account indirect carbon emissions arising from land conversion, 
introducing biofuels targets is found to increase carbon emissions at the worldwide level.  
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1  Introduction 
It is well-known that to be able to cut carbon emissions in the near future, clean substitutes to fossil 
fuels must be found. Biofuels have gained widespread attention over recent years as a promising 
candidate, especially in the transportation sector. In fact, plant-based fuels such as ethanol and 
biodiesel have emerged as the only viable substitutes for petroleum-based fuels in transportation. 
Other candidates, such as fuel cells and hydrogen are currently far from being economically viable. 
In contrast, several clean alternatives to coal exist for use in the electricity sector, including solar, 
wind, hydro, and nuclear power. Another argument for increased production of biofuels is energy 
security. Many countries have a desire for less dependence on foreign countries for vital energy 
supplies. For instance, to reduce US oil imports, the Renewable Fuel Standards require the use of 36 
billion gallons of ethanol by 2022 (DOE 2008). 
Several important issues have arisen with the increased production of biofuels. First, this is land-
based fuel production. When arable land is a scarce resource that is also crucial in the production of 
food, the growth in biofuels production may well result in reduced food supply and increased food 
prices. Furthermore, by converting existing grasslands and forests into farmland, there is a leakage of 
sequestered carbon into the atmosphere. Deforestation induced carbon emissions can create a so-
called carbon debt, which undermines the central argument for biofuels; namely that they reduce 
carbon emissions compared to fossil fuels (Fargione et al. 2008). The aim of this paper is to study the 
implications of increased use of biofuels, with a particular focus on agricultural production and food 
prices. We do this by modeling petroleum as a scarce resource in a Hotelling framework, which 
means that the oil price increases over time. Land, which is allocated to food and biofuels 
production, is also a scarce resource. Since land quality differs dramatically across geographical areas, 
land is modeled within a Ricardian framework. The novel feature of the model is that the 
substitution between petroleum-based fuels and biofuels is induced through prices, which in turn are 
affected by policies, such as mandatory blending of biofuels. This enables us to better analyze the 
consequences of biofuels policies on biofuels production, food production and carbon emissions. 3 
 
The existing economic work on the impact of biofuels on the agricultural sector and induced carbon 
emissions can broadly be divided into two main categories based on whether the models describe 
only the agricultural sector or the agricultural sector together with the transportation sector. 
Schneider and McCarl (2003) focus on the agricultural sector and adopt a partial equilibrium 
approach of land allocation in the United States between agriculture and forestry. Their study 
investigates at what carbon prices biofuel is a viable mitigation option. Other papers study the 
competitiveness of biofuels by looking at the interaction between transportation and agriculture. 
Reilly and Paltsev (2009) incorporate biomass technologies in a land allocation model within a 
general equilibrium framework based on the MIT Emissions Predictions and Policy Analysis model 
(EPPA). Several studies use the trade and general equilibrium model (GTAP) to explore the impact 
of biofuels production on world agricultural markets specifically focusing on US and EU biofuel 
policies (Banse et al. 2008, Birur et al. 2009, Hertel et al. 2009). Chakravorty et al. (2008) develop a 
dynamic model of energy choice with competition for land between food production and a clean 
land-based energy source. They consider resource scarcity and obtain analytical results on the effects 
of carbon targets on land use. See Chakravorty et al. (2009) for a recent survey of the literature. 
Our study adds to the above literature in several ways. First, we explicitly take into account resource 
scarcity by coupling a Hotelling model and a Ricardian model. Existing studies do not explicitly 
model both petroleum and land scarcity simultaneously. Whereas Schneider and McCarl (2003) 
explicitly take into account land scarcity without considering an endogenous demand for 
transportation services, Hertel et al. (2009), Reilly and Paltsev (2009) and Birur et al. (2009) consider 
land scarcity, but without considering petroleum scarcity. This is an important extension of the 
existing work, since both the availability of land and petroleum resources are crucial for 
understanding the future of transportation energy. Second, while existing studies typically limit the 
analysis to considering first-generation biofuels, we consider a range of alternative energy sources for 
transportation over the next century, including both first and second-generation biofuels. The 
GTAP studies serves as an example of the existing literature (Banse et al. 2008, Birur et al. 2009, 
Hertel et al. 2009). These studies analyze the impact of mandatory blending of biofuels for first-
generation biofuels in the United States and the European Union, but do not consider the potential 
use of second-generation biofuels. Recent scientific studies suggest that second-generation biofuels 
will become commercially viable very soon (IEA 2009), and it is therefore important to also include 4 
 
this energy source as a possible alternative to traditional transportation fuels. Furthermore, pro-
biofuel policies in the United States require the use of 21 billion gallons of second-generation 
biofuels (cellulosic ethanol) by 2022. The main advantages of second-generation biofuels are that 
they are less land-using and less carbon intensive. Consequently, second-generation biofuels may 
have important implications both for land use, agricultural production and emissions. Our third 
contribution to the literature is related to the recent finding that when indirect carbon emissions are 
taken into account in addition to direct emissions, the central argument for using biofuels does not 
hold anymore: biofuels do not reduce carbon emissions compared to petroleum based fuel sources 
(Fargione et al. 2008, Searchinger et al. 2008). The indirect emissions are a result of converting 
marginal land or forests into farmland for producing biofuel crops, which releases sequestered 
carbon into the atmosphere. To date, no study has measured the indirect land use effects and the 
corresponding effect on emissions of biofuels development at the world-wide level. In our model, 
both direct and indirect carbon emissions are accounted for, and our study therefore gives a better 
measure of the carbon footprint of biofuels than previous studies. 
We find that biofuel policies have less of an impact on food prices than suggested in previous 
studies. This can be explained by the fact that our model includes non-land using second-generation 
biofuels, in addition to traditional (land-using) biofuels. Second-generation biofuels do not compete 
with food for land, hence, using more second-generation biofuels instead of first-generation biofuels 
reduces the impact of biofuels on food production and food prices. Another interesting finding is 
the importance of marginal lands both on carbon emissions through indirect carbon emissions from 
land conversion, and on the increase in food prices. Food prices are found to increase twice as fast 
over the next couple of decades if marginal lands are not put into agricultural production. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model that underlies the empirical 
model, which is presented in the following section, along with the economic trade-offs we consider 
in the allocation of land and energy. Section 3 also describes the scenarios considered in the 
empirical analysis. The simulation results are presented in section 4 along with a sensitivity analysis. 
The last section concludes the paper. 5 
 
2  The Basic Model with Land and Petroleum Scarcity 
We start out by giving a brief introduction to the basic model underlying our empirical model. This 
is done by extending the model developed by Chakravorty et al. (2008) to include a mandatory 
blending policy. The implications of such policy are analyzed empirically below and we therefore 
analyze the implications that can be obtained from the basic model when introducing a mandatory 
blending constraint.  
As in the model by Chakravorty et al. (2008), we look at an economy with two goods; a food 
commodity and transportation energy services, where the latter are provided from oil and biofuels. 
There are two primary production factors in the model; land and oil. Contrary to the empirical 
model, land is assumed homogenous in the basic model and the total availability of land is denoted 
L , which may be allocated to the production of food or energy crops. The residual land is fallow. A 
linear relationship is assumed between the input of land and production of energy and food. The 
other scarce resource in the model is oil. The unit cost of extracting oil is lower than the cost of 
producing biofuels from land:  xb cc < . The production of energy from the extracted oil (x) and 
biofuels (b ) are treated as perfect substitutes. This is not consistent with existing biofuels, such as 
E5 or E85, where oil and biofuels are used in fixed proportions to produce energy services. In the 
empirical model presented below, we relax the assumption of perfect substitution.  
The consumption of oil causes carbon emissions whereas land-based fuels are assumed to be carbon 
neutral in the basic model. In the empirical model, however, land-based fuels are not carbon neutral, 
but less carbon intensive than petroleum based fuel, which is in line with the recent literature on the 
topic. The stock of carbon in the atmosphere is assumed to increase with carbon emissions, and 
decrease at a given diffusion rate over time. The model is analyzed by solving the dynamic 
optimization problem of the social planner who allocates land to food and fuel production to 
maximize the net discounted value of the representative consumer’s utility, which is derived from 
consumption of food and transportation services, minus production costs. Chakravorty et al. (2008) 
give the details of the basic model and characterize the solution to the dynamic problem in the 
unregulated case. They also look at the case of a cap on the carbon stock. We extend their model to 
analyze another form of regulation; mandatory blending of biofuels. 6 
 
Biofuels mandatory blending requires that the share of land-based fuels in the energy portfolio 
should be greater or equal to a certain share s from date T . The effect of this policy can be 









   (1) 
Let μ  denote the shadow price of the mandatory blending constraint. The current value Lagrangian 




ff e b f f b b x f b b b x
b
L
luL u xL c L c L c x x LL L L x s
Lx
λπ γ γ μ
⎛⎞
⎡⎤ =+ + − − − − + − − + + + − ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ − ⎝⎠
,(2) 
where  () f u ⋅  and  () e u ⋅  are utility functions for food and energy,  f c  and  e c  are the unit costs of 
producing food and biofuels,  f L  and  b L  denote land used for food production and biofuel 
production, λ  and π  are the shadow values of the petroleum stock and land, and  b γ  and  g γ  are 
the shadow values of the non-negativity constraints on land used to produce biofuels and the oil 
stock. 
When the mandatory blending constraint is introduced into the social planner’s problem, the first-
order conditions for biofuels and petroleum production become: 
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3 For additional details, see Chakravorty et al. (2008). 7 
 
Other optimality conditions are identical to those reported by Chakravorty et al. (2008) for the basic 
model. 
Assume first that the mandatory blending constraint is not binding (unregulated case) so that  0 μ = . 
The full marginal costs of biofuels and oil are then given as the sum of production cost, the shadow 
value of the land or oil stock constraint, and the non-negativity constraint on land used in biofuels 
production or on the oil stock, respectively. The full cost of production is therefore higher than the 
unit costs of production,  f c  and  e c . Producing energy from oil is cheaper than producing energy 
from biofuels ( b x c c < ). However, to determine the optimal fuel source, the full cost of production 
must be taken into account. The augmented or full unit costs of using these scarce resources are 
xx pcλ =+  and  bb pcπ =+ , respectively, for oil and land-based fuels. As oil becomes scarcer, its 
shadow price λ  increases driving up the price of energy.  At some point the energy price may be 
high enough to justify producing energy from land fuels. Oil and land fuels are jointly competitive 
once their full marginal costs are strictly equal:  π λ + = + b x c c . 
Assume now that the mandatory blending constraint is binding ( 0 μ > ). It can be shown that the 
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. Hence, the shadow value of the mandatory blending 
constraint can be interpreted as a subsidy on land fuels and a tax on oil. This changes the timing of 
when land fuels are adopted as well as the time when the oil stock is depleted. Since the full cost of 
producing biofuels decreases, biofuels become competitive earlier. For oil, on the other hand, the 
full cost increases, which slows down the extraction of oil and postpones the depletion of the oil 
stock. This is illustrated in the empirical analysis presented below.  
Second-generation biofuels do not require the use of any scarce resource in our model. Hence, the 
unit cost of production does not need to be augmented with any shadow price in order to obtain the 
full cost, i.e., the unit production cost is the full unit cost. Introducing second-generation biofuels to 
the model implies that this technology becomes economically viable when the production cost 8 
 
equals the full production cost of the other fuels that are currently in production, as discussed 
above. 
With this in place, we present the simulation model, which is used to analyze inter alia the policy of 
biofuels mandatory blending. 
3  The Simulation Model 
In this section we add more structure to the theoretical model outlined above by specifying 
functional forms and estimating the model based on available data. For a more detailed description 
of the model, how it is estimated and the data used, see the appendix A. 
As mentioned above, two costly substitutes to oil are available, first and second-generation biofuels, 
the latter being the backstop technology. Feedstock costs comprise more than half the costs of 
producing first-generation biofuels (FAO 2008).
4 For this reason we use a land-allocation model 
with endogenous prices based on the Ricardian rent principle coupled with a Hotelling model. The 
model distinguishes between two aggregate food commodities: vegetarian and animal protein 
products, and three types of productive land. All types of land can be used as cropland or 
pastures/forestland (marginal lands). Crop production may be transformed into food, animal feed or 
energy. Furthermore, the model considers international trade between five regions: the United 
States, the European Union (EU27), other OECD countries, Medium Income Economies, and Low 
Income Economies. Medium Income Economies consists of large biofuels producers such as Brazil, 
Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as China and India; countries that are expected to account for a 
considerable share of the increased energy demand in the decades to come, and other countries. 
Low Income Economies are mainly African countries. Another key feature of the model is that it 
can be used to measure greenhouse gas emissions from transportation by distinguishing between the 
carbon content of each resource used. Finally, the indirect carbon emissions are taken into account. 
The main features of the supply side of the model are presented in Erreur ! Source du renvoi 
introuvable..a and 1.b. 
 
                                                 
4 A feedstock is the raw material or crops used in the biofuels production process. 9 
 
Despite international trade in agricultural products being highly protected, we assume no barriers to 
international trade in the model and we treat goods as perfectly homogenous. Food products in the 
model are aggregate and it is therefore difficult to introduce trade barriers, which are typically 
specific to each food market (sugar, wheat, etc.). Only final food products are traded in the model. 
In addition there is trade in primary energy: petroleum, first-generation biofuels and the second-
generation biofuels. We have introduced current US and EU trade barriers on biofuels markets in 
the model. The US bio-ethanol trade policy includes a 2.5% ad valorem tariff and a per unit tariff of 
US$ 0.54 per gallon (Yacobucci and Schnepf, 2007). The European Union trade policy includes a 
6.5% ad valorem tariff on biofuel imports (Kojima et al. 2007). 
Regional food demand is modeled as a function of population and per capita income. A boom in 
world food and energy requirements is expected to occur over the next five decades before the 
growth levels out. The world population is projected to grow from a current population of about 6 
billion people to around 9 billion people by 2050, where it is projected to level out (UNDP 2004). 
However, there will be significant regional disparities since 80% of the increase in world population 
will occur in Middle and Low Income Economies, and consequently, these regions are projected to 
account for the bulk of the increase in food and energy needs. As people become richer, we expect 
to observe increased consumption of meat and dairy and reduced consumption of vegetarian 
products. Meat production is more land consuming than the production of vegetarian products 
(Cranfield et al. 1998 and 2003, Delgado et al. 1998). In fact, to obtain one kilogram of meat and 
dairy products, three kilograms of cereals are needed (Bouwman et al., 2005). For this reason we 
distinguish between two food goods: vegetarian and animal protein products. The shift towards 
animal protein products is modeled by letting income elasticities be functions of per capita income.
5  
Each of the five regions has an endowment of land and petroleum resources. Middle Income 
Economies include the Middle-East and are endowed with large petroleum reserves. Agricultural 
areas and land qualities are also unevenly distributed among regions. Whereas less than one quarter 
of the world’s agricultural area is located in OECD countries (USA, EU and other OECD 
countries), this region has nearly half of the areas of the highest land quality. We return to 
agricultural production below, but first we look at how energy supply is modeled. 
                                                 





Figure 1.a: Energy production process. 
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The supply of energy is described in Figure 1.a, which shows the different stages of the energy 
production process from resource extraction (oil) or land allocation, to final products (energy 
services for transportation). The scarcity of fossil fuels is implemented by defining an exogenous 
resource stock for each region, as outlined in the one-region basic model described above. Data on 
current petroleum stocks have been obtained from the annual survey of the World Energy Council 
(WEC 2007).
6 With the steady increase in petroleum prices, resource stocks with higher extraction 
costs, such as oil sands, becomes competitive. Because the least costly stocks are extracted first, 
extraction costs increase with cumulative extraction. This is implemented in the model by using the 
functional form of the extraction cost function of Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) and Chakravorty et al. 
(2009). Parameter values are found through calibration using data from Rogner (1997) and the 
European Commission (2000). Both conventional and non-conventional resources are considered. 
Of the substitutes for oil, first-generation biofuels are land using and the energy yields depend upon 
the feedstock used. Different feedstocks require different climates and land qualities. Consequently, 
different feedstocks are used in different geographical areas. For instance, in Medium Income 
                                                 
6 We consider the following types of petroleum reserves: crude oil, oil shale, heavy oil and bituminous sands. 11 
 
Countries where first-generation biofuels are produced from sugarcane, about 1,700 gallons of 
ethanol are produced per hectare of land. In High Income Countries biofuels are produced from 
corn and the production is 800 gallons per hectare (Senauer 2008). Finally, in Low Income 
Countries, energy yields for first-generation biofuels are only about 400 gallons per hectare (FAO 
2008).
7  
Each region’s comparative advantage in the production of biofuels depends on the feedstock used. 
For instance, ethanol in Brazil is obtained from sugarcane, which can be cultivated on low quality 
land, whereas in the United States it is produced from corn, which requires higher quality land. The 
higher the land quality used, the higher the production cost of biofuels. Most food crops require 
high land quality, which leads to a more aggressive competition between agriculture and energy for 
land, and, in turn, increases the opportunity cost of land. As described when introducing the basic 
model above, both energy yields and the opportunity cost of land affects the production cost of 
biofuels. The cost of producing one gallon of ethanol from sugarcane in Brazil is US$ 0.94, while the 
cost of producing one gallon of ethanol from corn in the United States is US$ 1.51 (FAO 2008).
8 
For further details on production costs per region, see appendix A. 
A common feature of second-generation biofuels is that they use little or no land (OECD 2008).
9 
Second-generation biofuel technologies that are currently under development may make it possible 
to use lignocellulosic biomass or wastes in biofuels production. Cellulosic wastes, including waste 
products from agriculture and forestry, wastes from processing, and organic parts from municipal 
wastes are potential sources (FAO 2008). The technologies used are still only at the stage of research 
and development, and their production cost is currently US$ 5 per gallon (IEA 2009). In addition, 
they may be limited by driving distance once implemented at full scale (Ryan et al. 2006). Hence, a 
capacity constraint which restricts second-generation biofuel development is imposed on these 
technologies. Due to the assumption of exogenous technical progress, production cost decreases 
exponentially over time, whereas the production capacity increases exponentially. 
                                                 
7 Estimate based on first-generation biofuel production from cassava. 
8 These costs include feedstocks, processing and energy costs and is defined based on the cost of land which is 
endogenous. They are defined net of the co-products value and net of subsidies. In Brazil, there is no subsidy whereas 
there is a subsidy of US$ 0.51 per gallon in the United States. 
9 Second-generation technologies are defined in the appendix.  12 
 
First-generation biofuels are already mixed with petroleum to meet energy demand in transportation, 
but there is still scope for displacing fossil fuels in conventional vehicles (OECD 2008). 
Conventional petrol vehicles are compatible with blends of 10% ethanol (E10). However, flexi-fuel 
vehicles are designed for blends of 85% ethanol (E85) (Bomb et al. 2007). We deal with this by 
modeling the production of energy from petroleum and bio-oil using a constant elasticity of 
substitution production function. The elasticity of substitution is a key parameter for predicting 
future development of land-based fuels as it determines how easy it is to replace fossil fuels by 
biofuels in response to changes in the relative price between these resources. Since there is also 
uncertainty about the value of this elasticity, a sensitivity analysis will be carried out. Finally, second-
generation biofuels are treated as perfect substitutes for petroleum and first-generation biofuels in 
the model (Lasco and Khanna 2009). 
In addition to modeling energy choices, this study considers GHG emissions by fuel source.
10 
Petroleum is the most polluting energy and the emissions occur mainly in the fuel consumption 
stage. Emissions from biofuels occur primarily in the production process, and the model also takes 
into account these emissions. On average, each gallon of conventional oil consumed releases 0.0032 
tons of carbon (Lasco and Khanna 2009). Emissions can be reduced by shifting towards less 
polluting resources such as first and second-generation biofuels. Carbon emissions from first-
generation biofuels depend on the feedstock used (Peña 2008). Whereas 0.0004 tons of carbon is 
released to produce one gallon of sugarcane based ethanol, 0.0017 tons of carbon is emitted when 
ethanol is produced from corn (Lasco and Khanna 2009). In addition, if biofuels production causes 
conversion of forestlands into agricultural lands sequestered carbon is released into the atmosphere. 
This so-called carbon debt reduces the carbon benefits of displacing fossil fuels by biofuels 
(Fargione et al. 2008, Searchinger et al. 2008). By cultivating tropical forests, about 700 tons of 
carbon per hectare are released back into the atmosphere. Second-generation biofuels are the least 
carbon intensive of the fuels we consider, with emissions of 0.0002 tons of carbon per gallon of fuel 
produced (Lasco and Khanna 2009). 
 
                                                 
10 Carbon emissions resulting from conversion of pastureland into cropland are not considered since they are 
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The agricultural supply in the model is outlined in Figure 1.b, which describes the production 
process of land-based commodities from the allocation of various land classes to the production of 
final products. We use the land classifications established by the Natural Resources Conservation 
Service of the United States Department for Agriculture (Wiebe 2003). There are three categories of 
land in the model; land classes I-III, where I refers to the most productive land.
11 Table 1 depicts the 
characteristics of each land class in terms of available area and agricultural yields by region. As 
mentioned above, the distribution of land quality across regions is not even. Half of the agricultural 
land in OECD countries (USA, EU and other OECD countries) is classified as Land Class I, 
whereas the corresponding shares are 20% and 18% in Middle and Low Income Countries, 
respectively. The total area of agricultural land available at the beginning of the study period is 1.5 
billion hectares. More than 50% of this area is located in Middle Income Economies, whereas the 
remaining area is fairly evenly distributed between High and Low Income Economies.  
                                                 
11 See appendix for more information on land classifications. 14 
 
 
Table 1. Agricultural area and yields per regions and per land class.  
  Area (billion 
hectares) 
Crop Yields 
(tons per hectar) 
Class I  0.225  3.50 
Class II  0.095  2.50  OECD Countries 
Class III  0.056  1.00 
Class I  0.300  2.50 
Class II  0.200  1.75  Medium Income 
Countries 
Class III  0.195  0.70 
Class I  0.150  1.75 
Class II  0.250  1.00  Low Income 
Countries 
Class III  0.061  0.40 
Sources: Land availability (Wiebe 2003), agricultural yields (FAOSTAT). 
The recent boom in biofuels production has resulted in significant increases in food prices and 
accelerated the rate of deforestation in some tropical countries, such as Indonesia and Brazil. 
According to FAO (2008), there are 1.6 billion hectares of land worldwide that could potentially be 
brought into cultivation. This land is of low productivity (classes II and III). All uncultivated land is 
located in Middle and Low Income Economies. Converting forestland into cropland is costly. Since 
the degree of accessibility to forestland differs, we assume that the conversion cost is increasing and 
convex in the area of land converted (Sohngen and Mendelsohn 1999). This is based on the 
assumption that the most easily accessible land is always used first. A complete description of this 
process, how it is dealt with in the model, and the data used to estimate the model are given in 
appendix A.  15 
 
Primary agricultural production exhibits constant returns to scale in the model, and technological 
progress exogenously enhances land quality.
12 Agricultural yields have doubled over the last four 
decades with an annual average growth rate of 2.3% since 1961. However, the growth in world 
agricultural output is projected to fall to 1.5% per year over the next decades, then to 0.9% per year 
over the subsequent decades (Rosegrant et al. 2001, FAO 2008). As agricultural production increases, 
lower land quality classes are cultivated and more pressure is put on available land resources. 
Consequently, production costs increase with primary production. 
As in the stylized model of Chakravorty et al. (2008), the land allocation decision in the empirical 
model is based on maximization of social surplus, and the optimal mix of petroleum resources and 
land fuels is driven by their relative price. Consumer and producer prices are found by maximizing 
social surplus under the various constraints presented above: technological constraints, the dynamics 
of the exhaustible resource stocks, and land availability. The model is simulated over the next 
century (2000-2100) in time steps of five years. A real annual discount rate of 2% is assumed.  
This concludes our presentation of the simulation model. For details on parameters used in the 
simulations, the data used to estimate the model, as well as a more detailed description of the 
empirical model, see the appendix. Below, the empirical model is used to analyze several scenarios, 
which are introduced next. 
3.1  Scenarios 
We consider several scenarios that differ along two dimensions: the assumptions made on scarcity 
rents and the availability of marginal lands, along one dimension, and regulations. The objective is to 
analyze how biofuels policies in the European Union and the United States affect agricultural 
production, food prices, land use across regions, and carbon emissions. The different scenarios are 
summarized in Table 2 and described in more detail below. 
                                                 
12 Investment in agriculture is intrinsically linked with food prices. However, due to the lack of econometric studies on 
the elasticity of agricultural yields to food prices at the worldwide level, we do not consider this feedback effect of food 
prices on agricultural productivity. 16 
 
Table 2. Definition of Scenarios 







EU and US 
mandatory blending
Finite oil stock,  
no marginal lands 
A.i  A.ii  A.iii A.iv 
Finite oil stock, 
 marginal lands 
available 
B.i  B.ii  B.iii B.iv 
Infinite oil stock, 
 no marginal 
lands13 
C.i  -  - - 
 
A.  Standard Hotelling model without marginal lands (forest) 
Oil stocks are finite and there are no marginal lands available under this model specification. This 
means that the scarcity rents of both oil and land are positive. Furthermore, with no marginal lands 
available, increased production of biofuels requires that land currently devoted to food production 
will have to be used to produce biofuels crops instead of food. 
B.  Standard Hotelling model with marginal lands (forest) 
In this model, the production of biofuels can take place on marginal lands. The marginal land is 
forest land, and is consequently not currently used in food production. The conversion of marginal 
lands into farmland causes sequestered carbon to be released into the atmosphere. The aim of this 
scenario is twofold. First, it measures the potential role of marginal lands in biofuels expansion. 
Second, it provides a better estimate of the carbon footprint of biofuels.    
C. Without oil scarcity and without marginal lands 
                                                 
13 We do not consider pro-biofuels policies for model C since this model is only included to analyze the impact of 
biofuels expansion on food prices and land allocation. 17 
 
In this model, there are no scarcity rents for oil. This is achieved by assuming an infinite stock of oil. 
The cost of extracting oil is, however, increasing over time, due to the assumption that the least 
costly oil fields are put into production first. We also assume that there is no marginal land available. 
This model is included to eliminate the effect of oil scarcity when analyzing the future of biofuels. 
With an infinite stock of oil, biofuels are not needed to replace oil as transportation fuels. This 
scenario allows us to isolate the effects of the boom of biofuels production on food prices and 
agricultural markets, and on carbon emissions savings induced by the displacement of oil by first and 
second-generation biofuels. 
For each of the three model specifications above (A-C), we analyze the effects of four different 
policy specifications: (i) no regulation, which is considered the benchmark case, (ii) mandatory 
blending of biofuels in the European Union, (iii) mandatory blending of biofuels in the United 
States, and (iv) mandatory blending of biofuels in the European Union and in the United States. 
Mandatory blending has recently been suggested implemented by several governments. 
Governments such as the United States and the European Union have established biofuel mandates 
to be achieved at target dates. Current regulations in the United States require the use of 36 million 
gallon of ethanol or biodiesel annually by 2022, of which 16 million by 2022 must be cellulosic 
ethanol, a second generation biofuel (DOE 2008). Hence, the US mandatory blending policy 
explicitly distinguishes between first and second-generation biofuels. This is not the case for the 
proposed EU mandatory blending policy. The European Union currently expects its member states 
to ensure that biofuels and other renewables have a 5.75% share of transportation fuels by 2010 and 
10% by 2020. With an average share of renewables in the EU25 countries of only 2% in 2007 
(OECD 2008), there is a long way to go. Since the the European Union Directive does not 
distinguish between first and second-generation biofuels, we look at two different policy options. In 
the first case, the share of first-generation biofuels of liquid fuels must exceed 10%, whereas in the 
second case, second-generation biofuels are used to reach the mandatory blending objective of 10%. 
Thus, the latter involves the use of both first and second-generation biofuels. 
Having introduced the model and the scenarios we will study, we turn to the actual analysis of the 
different model specifications and scenarios. 18 
 
4  Model Results 
The implementation of biofuels targets in the United States and the European Union raises the 
following questions: 1) What is the impact on world food prices and on the world agricultural 
sector? 2) What are the implications for future energy choices? The mandatory blending policies do 
not explicitly specify if first or second-generation biofuels are to be used. First-generation biofuels 
are land-using and may significantly affect the world agricultural sector. Second-generation biofuels 
are, however, still only at the stage of research and development. 3) What are the potential carbon 
savings from displacing petroleum by biofuels? Although biofuels are not carbon neutral, they are 
less carbon intensive than petroleum. The carbon savings are related to land-use changes, which 
induces carbon emissions. 4) What are the costs of these policies? We try to answer these questions 
below. Our presentation of the results is organized under several important topics: energy choices, 
the agricultural sector, carbon emissions, and policy implications. However, before we start looking 
at the results, some important model assumptions are highlighted. This is important in order to 
better understand the model predictions presented below. 
First, food demand and energy needs are projected to be substantial by the mid-century. By 2050, 
the current population of six billion people will have grown to nine billion people. The population 
growth then slows down, with an increase of only one billion people between 2050 and 2100. There 
will also be significant regional disparities in population growth. Whereas High Income Economies’ 
(United-States, European-Union, and other OECD countries) population are predicted to be fairly 
stable over the next century, Medium Income Economies’ population will increase by 41% and Low 
Income Economies’ population will more than double. In addition, world per capita income is 
predicted to increase steadily over the century, but at a decreasing rate. Again, regional disparities are 
expected, with highest growth rates in Medium and Low Income Economies. Second, on the supply 
side, technological change improves land quality and efficiency of first-and-second-generation 
biofuels. While agricultural expansion on forestlands is likely to play a significant role in meeting 
food and energy needs, the intensification of land use through improved technologies and 
management may complement this option (FAO 2008). We do not consider induced-technological 
change in the model; hence, the intensification of land use in the model is exogenous. The gain in 
agricultural productivity is expected to be lower in the century to come than in the past; but actual 
yields are still below their potential in most regions, the gap being larger in Medium and Low 19 
 
Income Economies (FAO 2008).
14  Technological progress is supposed to fulfil the gap between 




In the absence of regulations, petroleum remains the main energy source until well beyond the mid-
century in all regions regardless of model specification used (A-C). Focusing first on scenarios A and 
B, in which oil is scarce, our results show that the world’s petroleum stocks are projected to be used 
until the end of the century, but with a declining share of the total supply of transportation energy. 
The world share of petroleum in liquid fuels does not vary much across policy scenarios nor model 
setup (A or B), and is about 97% until 2015 under all scenarios. The share of petroleum then shows 
a steady decline to about 70% by mid-century and just below 40% by the end of the century. The 
differences between scenarios are small also when looking at total production of petroleum. Thus, 
the effect of biofuel policies on petroleum consumption and the share of petroleum in 
transportation energy is small. 
In addition to petroleum, there are two other sources for transportation fuel: first and second-
generation biofuels. Although the relative energy share and the production quantity of petroleum are 
fairly stable across different policy scenarios, first and second-generation biofuel production varies 
considerable across scenarios. This is because biofuels account for a much smaller share of total 
transportation energy than petroleum. A one percent increase in the total energy share of biofuels is 
therefore considerable and may well require a 25% increase in biofuels production. Hence, the effect 
on world biofuels consumption of introducing mandatory blending in the European Union and the 
United States is considerable. If biofuels policies are introduced both in the European Union and 
the United States (A.iv), our results show that world consumption of biofuels is almost doubled by 
2020 compared to the policy scenario with no mandatory blending (A.i). Mandatory blending 
policies affect the price of energy, and, thus, the level of energy consumption. 
                                                 
14 In these regions, the development of irrigation technologies, the adoption of high-yielding varieties is expected to 
improve agricultural productivity.  
15 A direct implication of this option is that technological progress is higher in Medium and Low Income 
Economies. 20 
 
Table 3 summarizes the energy choices in 2020 under the different scenarios in the United States, 
the European Union and in the rest of the world (ROW). Without pro-biofuels policies in any 
region, the consumption of biofuels in 2020 in the United States and Europe is projected to be 15.8 
billion gallons. In the European-Union, the share of biofuels in total transportation does not exceed 
2% (see Table 3). If mandatory blending is introduced only in the European Union, the 
consumption of biofuels in 2020 in this region increases to 35.5 billion gallons (if target is met using 
second-generation biofuels) or 10.0% of EU fuel consumption. Similar, with mandatory blending in 
the United States, US biofuel consumption increases to 180 billion gallons or a 21.4% share of total 
transportation fuels (see Table 3). 
The date of adoption of second-generation biofuels differs across regions, with adoption occurring 
first in OECD and Medium Income Economies due to the relatively lower production costs in these 
regions. Across all scenarios, the share of second-generation biofuels increases over time from the 
date of adoption and accounts for almost a quarter of transportation energy by 2050 (scenarios A.ii 
and B.ii).
16  
As a result of increased consumption of biofuels in the area in which mandatory blending is 
introduced, the price of biofuels increases relative to petroleum. Consequently, the demand for 
petroleum increases in the rest of the world at the expense of biofuels. For example, following the 
introduction of mandatory blending in the United States in the scenario with no marginal lands 
(A.iii), biofuels account for over 20% of total transportation energy in the United States by 2020, 
which is more than ten times as much as without a biofuels policy (A.i). At the same time, the share 
of biofuels in the rest of the world is reduced by about 6%. The overall effect on total fuel 
consumption is nonetheless that the use of biofuels increases fourfold while petroleum consumption 
is reduced by 5% in 2020 relative to the base case scenario (A.i). The same substitution effect is 
observed when looking at the introduction of mandatory blending in the European Union, although 
the effect is weaker since Europe’s share of world energy consumption is lower than that of the 
United States. This substitution effect explains the carbon leakage that we discuss in more detail 
below when we look at carbon emissions. 
                                                 
16 Since the production capacity of second-generation biofuels within the European Union is constrained, secnd-
generation biofuels may need to be imported to reach the target. This is accounted for in the model.  21 
 
Turning to the effects of introducing mandatory blending in the European Union, we find that it 
makes a big difference whether the mandatory blending requirement is met by increasing the use of 
first or second-generation biofuels. This affects the relative shares of first and second-generation 
biofuels, the timing of when second-generation biofuels are introduced, and trade in biofuels. When 
the mandatory blending requirement is met by increasing the use of second-generation biofuels, we 
find that the introduction of second-generation biofuels is brought forward ten years (2020 rather 
than 2030) in addition to representing a higher share of total fuels. This has important implications 
for carbon emissions and food prices, as we return to below, since second-generation biofuels 
require far less land than first-generation biofuels. Finally, EU energy prices show a small increase 
(2%) in 2020 as a result of the policy (i.e., compared to scenarios A.i and B.i). If, instead, the EU 
mandatory blending requirement is met by increasing the use of first-generation biofuels, the target 
is reached by increased domestic production of first-generation biofuels, mainly due to high trade 
barriers in the European Union. The substitution effect is in this case found to be slightly larger: in 
the rest of the world petroleum consumption increases slightly more and the reduction in biofuels 
consumption is bigger as biofuels become relatively more expensive compared to petroleum. 
The difference between scenarios A and B is that marginal land (forests) is only available in the 
latter. Thus, by comparing the two, we can analyze the impact of using marginal lands to meet the 
increased demand for land-based fuel and food. World consumption of first-generation biofuels 
increases steadily until the end of the century under both scenarios. However, when marginal lands 
are available, first-generation biofuels production shows an increase of 218% from 2005 to 2050 
(B.i) while the increase is 173% without marginal lands (A.i). Consequently, the effect of marginal 
lands on biofuel production is considerable. This also has important implications for carbon 
emissions and the carbon leakage effect. We discuss that in detail below. 
Medium Income Economies play an important role in the market for first-generation biofuels. This 
region is the world’s largest first-generation biofuels consumer and producer, with the United States 
as the second largest economy.
17 On the supply side, countries such as Brazil, Malaysia and 
                                                 
17 Over the base-period, the United-States is the world’s largest consumer and producer of first-generation biofuels. 
However, during the simulation period, this country looses its leadership in favour of Medium Income Countries 
since most of the rise in energy demand comes from this region, also, this region benefits from a comparative 
advantage.    22 
 
Indonesia benefit from a comparative advantage in producing first-generation biofuels on the basis 
of production costs (models A and B) and land abundance (model B). On the demand side, the 
largest increase in energy needs will occur in this region where particularly China and India will drive 
up the demand. 
Most existing studies on energy choices focus on long-term substitution in the electricity sector. 
Hence, there are few other studies to compare our results to. However, according to engineering 
studies, backstop technologies are expected to be cost competitive from 2040 (Peña, 2008). Our 
study projects that backstop technologies will be competitive well before this time. This earlier 
adoption can be explained by the fact that we model land competition between energy and 
agriculture. With increased competition for land, the opportunity cost of land increases, making 
first-generation biofuels relatively less competitive over time compared to second-generation 
biofuels that do not require any land.  
Table 3. Energy choices under different scenarios in 2020 in the United States, the European Union, 













Scenario   USA EU  ROW USA  EU  ROW USA EU  ROW
A.i  814 358  1,395 16  3  34  0  0  0 
A.ii.1  816 334  1,399 14  37  33  0  0  0 
A.ii.2  814  319  1,387 15 5 34 0 30 0 
A.iii  662 358  1,406 60  3  32  120  0  0 
A.vi  662  320  1,408 61 5 32  119  31 0 
B.i 813  358 1,396 17  4  37  0  0  0 
B.ii.1  815 335  1,400 16  37  35  0  0  0 
B.ii.2  814  320  1,398 17 6 36 0 29 0 23 
 
B.iii  662 358  1,406 61  4  35  119  0  0 
B.vi  663  321  1,408 61 6 36  119  29 0 
 
4.2  Agricultural sector 
Turning to the agricultural sector, the simulation results show that there will be a substantial increase 
in the demand for land until 2045. This is due to fast growth in food requirements, particularly in 
Medium and Low Income Economies. Increased demand for land raises the opportunity cost of 
land, which increases the price of goods produced with land as an input (biofuels, food). For 
example, in the base model without marginal lands (A.i), the opportunity costs of land are projected 
to increase approximately 74% from 2005 to 2050 (all land classes and regions). In addition, the 
increase in energy needs combined with a steady depletion of petroleum resources increase the 
demand for petroleum substitutes. Since second-generation biofuels are not economically viable for 
another couple of decades, the increased demand for substitutes to petroleum increases the demand 
for first-generation biofuels and thus for land.  
Looking at the effect on food prices, the predictions depend on the model specification used.
18 The 
effect is strongest if there is no marginal land available (model specification A). Even without 
policies promoting the production and use of biofuels, the price of food increases by 9.0% from 
2005 to 2030 (A.i). With no marginal lands and no biofuels policies (A.i), second-generation biofuels 
come into production in 2030, and soon after the growth in food prices stagnates, before starting to 
fall in 2045. However, if marginal lands are available, less pressure is put on land resources and the 
increase in food prices is lower. Our results show that in this case the price of food increases by 
4.2% from 2005 to 2030 (B.i), or about half the increase we found when marginal lands are 
unavailable. Marginal lands are therefore important in meeting the increased demand for food and 
fuel over the next decades, as the availability of marginal lands is projected to considerably dampen 
the rapid growth in food prices over the next decades.  
                                                 
18 In the following, when referring to the food price, we refer to a Laspeyres food price index that was constructed 
with 2005 as the base period. 24 
 
To evaluate the impact of biofuel production on food prices we look at scenario C.i, where no 
biofuels are produced since petroleum stocks are assumed infinite in model specification C. Under 
this scenario, all available land is used to produce food. Equilibrium food prices are found to 
increase by 2.8% up until 2030, when food prices level out before they start falling from 2045.  
As already noted mandatory blending policies boost the production of biofuels. Since increased 
production of first-generation biofuels means that more land must be used to produce fuel, this 
shifts the opportunity cost of land upwards, which in turn leads to increased food prices. Looking at 
the results from the different simulation scenarios, the general finding is that the introduction of 
biofuels policies has a limited effect on food prices. There are some differences in the impact on 
food prices between the different scenarios, though, which we discuss in the following.  
We start out by looking at the effect of introducing mandatory blending in the European Union. 
There is a noticeable difference in the effect of mandatory blending depending on whether the 
biofuels target is met by increasing the production of first or second-generation biofuels. Second-
generation biofuels are non-land using; consequently, food prices are unaffected when the biofuels 
target is met by relying only on this technology. If, instead, first-generation biofuels are used to reach 
the target, food prices over the period 2020-2040 are projected to be about 0.6% (A.ii) or 0.4% (B.ii) 
higher than under the unregulated scenarios (A.i and B.i), depending on whether or not marginal 
lands are available.
19 
Similar patterns are observed when analyzing the implications of introducing mandatory blending 
policies in the United States. The increase in first-generation biofuels production relative to the 
unregulated case results in an increase in food prices in 2020 of 0.8% (A.iii) and 0.2% (B.iii) 
depending on whether marginal land is available, compared to the baseline scenarios (A.i and B.i). 
The largest effect on food prices is observed when mandatory blending is introduced both in 
Europe and in the United States, since this involves a larger total production of biofuels. However, 
if second-generation biofuels are used to cover the additional demand for biofuels in the European 
Union as a result of the EU policy, the impact on food prices is basically the same as what we found 
when a biofuels target is only introduced in the United States (policy scenario iii). 
                                                 
19 This is calculated as the difference in food price index between the scenario with biofuel policy (A.ii or B.ii) and 
the unregulated case (A.i or B.i) relative to the food price in the base scenario (A.i and B.i) for specific years. 25 
 
The United States accounts for a significant share of the world’s transportation energy market. 
Nonetheless we find that introducing a biofuels target in the United States does not have much of a 
impact on food prices, not even compared to the impact of an EU biofuels target. This is because 
non-land using second-generation biofuels are important in meeting the US biofuels target; 
approximately half the biofuels consumed to meet the target are second generation. We conclude 
that introducing biofuels policy in Europe and/or the United States is expected to have only a minor 
impact on world food prices because of the introduction of second-generation biofuels.  
In addition, mandatory blending has effects on international trade. For example, mandatory blending 
policies in the United States cause US agricultural exports to decrease because agricultural land 
traditionally used to produce food is put into production of biofuel crops. This mainly affects 
Medium Income Economies who would otherwise import agricultural products from the United 
States. The same is observed when looking at the implications of an EU biofuels target on trade. 
This is important for understanding the consequences of mandatory blending on indirect carbon 
emissions, as is discussed below. 
Given our projections that biofuels policies will have only a limited impact on total food production 
and the food price index, we do not expect these policies to significantly affect food consumption. 
However, the increasing food prices and lower food production may have certain implications for 
food consumption across regions. Comparing the policy scenarios where mandatory blending is 
imposed (policies ii-iv) to the unregulated case (policy i), we find that daily food consumption in 
OECD countries (United States, European Union and other Rich Income Economies) is projected 
to be less affected by mandatory blending policies than food consumption in Medium and Low 
Income Economies. However, the differences are small. There are two reasons why Low and 
Medium Income Economies have the largest decline in food consumption. First, price elasticities for 
food products are higher in these regions than in Rich Income Economies. Second, the 
implementation of biofuels targets in Europe and the United States is projected to shift domestic 
agricultural output from food export to domestic energy crops.  
Several other studies have looked at how biofuels and mandatory blending affect food prices and 
food consumption. Our predicted increase in world food prices as a result of mandatory blending in 
the European Union is systematically lower than what is found in other studies. For instance, Banse 26 
 
et al. (2008) project a decrease in cereals and sugar prices from 2001 to 2020 of 7-8% in absence of 
any regulation, while they project an increase of 2% in oilseeds prices when a mandatory blending is 
imposed in the European Union. The corresponding predictions without any regulation is a decrease 
in cereals and sugar prices of 12% and a decrease in oilseeds prices of 7% from 2001 to 2020. Our 
predictions are quite different. First, even in the absence of regulations, food prices are increasing 
over the period 2005-2020. In scenario B.i (with marginal lands), world food prices are projected to 
increase by 3.9%. Second, world food prices rise by 4.3% when the EU target is met by first-
generation biofuels and by 4.9% when the EU target is meat by either first or second generation 
biofuels. The increase in food prices is lower than what is found in the study by Banse et al. because 
we consider non-land using second-generation biofuels in addition to first-generation biofuels. 
 
4.3  Carbon emissions 
In this section we look at the potential for reducing carbon emissions by displacing petroleum by 
biofuels. The empirical model allows us to distinguish between direct and indirect carbon emissions. 
Recall that direct emissions are emissions directly related to the production of first-and-second-
generation biofuels and consumption of petroleum. Indirect emissions are those from converting 
marginal lands (grasslands and forestlands) into farmland, which causes sequestered carbon to be 
released into the atmosphere. Consequently, indirect emissions are only present in the model where 
marginal lands are available (B). Finally, notice that carbon emissions are closely linked to energy 
choices, which we discussed above. 
In absence of any biofuels regulation, OECD countries remain the largest carbon emitter until 2020 
(A.i and B.i). During this period the OECD is also the largest energy consumer. However, due to 
rapid increase in energy consumption in Medium Income Countries, that region takes over as the 
largest carbon emitter from 2020 onward. Although less polluting resources (first-and-second-
generation biofuels) are gradually substituting polluting resources (petroleum), the increase in total 
carbon emissions is still considerable. The most rapid growth in emissions occurs before 2025 in 
both scenarios (A.i and B.i), with an average annual growth over the period of 1.3% (A.i) and 3.9% 
(B.i), depending on whether marginal lands are available. Increased use of first-generation biofuels 
causes land-use changes that release carbon into the atmosphere. Under scenario B.i, grasslands and 27 
 
forestlands are converted into farmlands, with most of the conversion occurring between 2020 and 
2050. Due to land-use changes in Medium and Low Income Economies, indirect carbon emissions 
are actually higher than direct carbon emissions over the period when most the land conversion 
occurs in these regions. 
When a biofuel target is imposed in the European Union and in the United States, carbon emissions 
from these economies are expected to decrease. There is, however, a carbon leakage effect in other 
regions. This happens as a result of the aforementioned substitution effect when other regions 
increasing their use of petroleum based fuels as biofuels become relatively more expensive following 
the introduction of mandatory blending in the European Union and/or the United States. If 
mandatory blending is introduced both in the United States and the European Union, US and EU 
carbon emissions are projected to go down 10% and 7% from 2015 until 2025, respectively, 
compared to an increase of 6% and 3%, respectively, over the same period without mandatory 
blending (models A and B). Thus, mandatory blending clearly reduces carbon emissions in the 
regions introducing the policies.  
However, since mandatory blending in one region raises the worldwide price of biofuels relative to 
petroleum, the demand for petroleum in other regions increases at the expense of biofuels. This has 
important implications for emissions. Increased emissions associated with this substitution effect are 
commonly referred to as carbon leakage. To find the carbon leakage effect of the biofuels policies, 
we look at the development in total emissions in the rest of the world with and without mandatory 
blending in the United States and Europe. The extent of the carbon leakage effect depends critically 
on whether there is marginal land available that can be put into production. This is because the 
increased production of biofuels results in marginal lands being converted into farmland (model B), 
an activity that causes large carbon emissions when sequestered carbon is released into the 
atmosphere. Without any marginal lands (model A), total emissions in all regions apart from the 
United States and the European Union increases 26.5% from 2015 to 2025 in the unregulated case 
(A.i) compared to a 26.6% increase in the scenario with biofuels policies (A.iv). Thus, the carbon 
leakage effect is negligible without marginal lands.  
If, however, marginal lands are available (model B), the story is quite different. In this case total 
emissions in all regions apart from the United States and the European Union increase 280% in the 28 
 
unregulated case (B.i), compared to 304% when biofuels targets are imposed in the United States 
and Europe (B.iv). This represents an increase in carbon emissions in the rest of the world in 2025 
of 7.3% (or about 1 billion tons of carbon) as a consequence of the mandatory blending policies in 
the United States and the European Union. Out of the 7.3% increase in carbon emissions, 7.0% are 
due to changes in land use (indirect emissions) while only 0.3% are due to increases in direct carbon 
emissions. 
For any local environmental policy to have a reducing effect on total emissions and not only on local 
emissions, the direct emissions reductions must more than offset the carbon leakage effect. 
However, in this case our results suggests that the effect of mandatory policies (policy scenarios ii-iv) 
on total emissions is small and in some cases even negative, as the carbon leakage effect is larger 
than the direct emissions savings in the European Union and the United States. The carbon leakage 
effect is strongest if there is marginal land available, since in this case the indirect emissions from 
land conversion must also be taken into account. The effects of the various policy scenarios on 
carbon emissions are summarized in Table 4. Policies ii.1 and ii.2 refer to mandatory blending in the 
European Union satisfied by increasing the use of first and second-generation biofuels, respectively. 
 
Table 4. Carbon emissions 2015-2025: change compared to base case scenarios (A.i and B.i) 
  US  EU R.O.W.  Total  US  EU R.O.W.  Total 
   Scenario A.ii.1  Scenario B.ii.1 
2015  0.12% 0.17% 0.29% 0.21% 0.09% 0.14% 0.20% 0.16% 
2020  0.17% -1.61% 0.27% -0.02% 0.15% -1.37% 6.50% 4.13% 
2025  0.20% -1.93% 0.31% -0.02% 0.14% -1.10% 2.16% 1.67% 
   Scenario A.ii.2  Scenario B.ii.2 
2015  0.05% 0.10% 0.15% 0.11% 0.04% 0.08% 0.12% 0.08% 
2020  0.11% -9.80% 0.22% -1.21% 0.08% -9.59% 1.56% 0.02% 
2025  0.10% -9.79% 0.17% -1.16% 0.08% -9.37% 0.12% -0.47% 
   Scenario A.iii  Scenario B.iii 29 
 
2015  0.30% 0.41% 0.69% 0.52% 0.30% 0.40% 0.66% 0.50% 
2020 -14.66%  0.44%  0.72%  -4.20%  -14.62% 0.43%  19.38%  9.13% 
2025  -15.37%  0.41% 0.71% -4.22%  -15.16% 0.39% 7.11% 3.53% 
   Scenario A.iv  Scenario B.iv 
2015  0.39% 0.53% 0.87% 0.66% 0.35% 0.48% 0.82% 0.61% 
2020 -14.60%  -9.63%  0.87%  -5.51%  -14.53% -9.32%  20.97%  9.15% 
2025  -15.24%  -9.44% 0.92% -5.35%  -15.09% -9.07% 7.30% 3.11% 
 
Under scenario C.i biofuels are never used since petroleum reserves are unlimited. This case is not 
very realistic but can be used to illustrate the effect on emissions of substituting petroleum with 
biofuels in transportation fuels. Over the whole century, total emissions are 508% and 171% larger 
under scenario C.i than under scenarios A.i and B.i, respectively. This amounts to 524 and 396 
billion tons of additional carbon being emitted over the century, respectively, compared to scenarios 




Despite the recent increase in petroleum prices combined with technological improvements in 
biofuels production, government intervention is needed to promote the market introduction of 
biofuels. Our model can be used to calculate the subsidy needed to meet the biofuels targets in the 
European Union and in the United States. This is calculated from the shadow value of the biofuels 
target constraint (cf. theoretical model) in the optimization problem of the social planner. 
Consequently, the subsidy is only positive when the policy constraint is binding. The value of the 
implicit subsidy is expressed in dollars per gallon. This subsidy reaches its highest level between 
2020 and 2040 in scenario A.ii (EU target reached only with first-generation biofuels), during which 
time the subsidy should be about US$ 0.5 per gallon. Banse et al. (2008) calculated the internal 
subsidy to meet the European Directive on Biofuel. They found that in 2020, the subsidy would 
range from 30% of production costs in Sweden to almost 60% in the United Kingdom. If 30 
 
mandatory blending is introduced both in the United States and the European Union (A.iv), 
subsidies for second-generation biofuels are US$ 1.2 per gallon in the United States and US$ 0.2 per 
gallon in the European Union. Based on the currently production cost of second-generation biofuels 
of about US$ 4 per gallon, the subsidy represents 30% of total production cost in the United States 
and 5% in the European Union. Hence, the implicit biofuels subsidies we calculate for the European 
Union are considerable lower than the implicit subsidies reported by Banse et al. (2008). 
 
The relatively high cost of introducing biofuels policies must be taken into account when evaluating 
whether the biofuels targets are worthwhile. Our results indicate that the effect on total world level 
emissions of carbon is limited, and even negative if the policies cause more marginal lands to be put 
into crop production. Reduced local emissions are therefore offset by increased direct emissions 
elsewhere and indirect emissions from land-use changes. Hence, little is gained in terms of emission 
reductions. The other main reason for introducing a biofuels target is to reduce a region’s 
dependency on foreign countries to cover its energy needs. We found that a biofuels target can 
significantly reduce the dependency on foreign oil. Consequently, the relatively high cost of 
introducing the policies must be justified by the gains that are mainly in terms of increased energy 
security. There could also be gains in terms of learning by doing effects when using new 
technologies. However, such effects are not accounted for in our analysis. 
 
4.5  Sensitivity analysis 
There is uncertainty regarding the values of several key parameters used in the empirical analysis. 
These parameters include production costs of second-generation biofuels, the stock of petroleum 
resources, and the elasticity of substitution between first-generation biofuels and petroleum. To 
investigate the consequences of changing these values, three additional scenarios are designed. 
Scenario B.i (with marginal lands and no biofuels regulations) is considered the baseline scenario. In 
the first sensitivity analysis scenario, the initial value of the production cost of second-generation 31 
 
biofuels is US$ 3.5 per gallon or 30% lower than in the baseline scenario.
20 The rate of technical 
progress is the same as in the baseline scenario: production costs decrease by 30% by 2030. In the 
second scenario, we analyze the implications of the initial stock of petroleum being 20% higher than 
in the baseline scenario. Finally, in the third scenario, we look at the effect of lowering the elasticity 
of substitution between first-generation biofuels and petroleum. We assume the elasticity is uniform 
across the different regions and close to unity. The results from the scenarios are summarized in 
Table 5. All results are reported as the percentage change from the baseline scenario (B.i). We report 
the value of the variables at the world-wide level in 2020 and 2050. 
 
Table 5. World biofuels consumption and world carbon emissions: percentage change compared to 
base scenario (B.i). 
  Lower second-generation 
biofuels production cost 




  2020  2050  2020  2050  2020  2050 
Petroleum 
consumption  -13%  -2.7%  +14.0% +13.0% -1.1%  -0.6% 
First-generation 
biofuels consumption  -15%  -3.0%  -14.0%  -13.0% +250%  +200% 
Second-generation 
biofuels consumption  0.0%
21  +2.5%  0.0%
22  0.0%  0.0%
23  0.0% 
Carbon emissions: 













             - Indirect   0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  -6.0%  0.0%  +2.0% 
                                                 
20 IEA (2009) defines two scenarios; optimistic and pessimistic. Under the pessimistic scenario, production costs of 
second-generation biofuels amount to US$ 5 per gallon and is expected to decrease by 30% until 2030. These 
numbers have been used in the baseline scenario. Under the optimistic scenario, production costs of second-
generation biofuels amounts to US$ 3.5.   
21 Second-generation biofuels are adopted in 2020 in this scenario.  
22 Second-generation biofuels are adopted ten years later than in the baseline scenario.  
23 The date of adoption of second-generation biofuels is not affected by a change in the value of the elasticity of 
substitution.  32 
 
 
When production costs of second-generation biofuels are reduced, the competitiveness of second-
generation biofuels is improved and they are adopted ten years earlier than under the baseline 
scenario.  As a result, petroleum and first-generation biofuels consumption fall leading to a decline 
in direct carbon emissions.  
If the petroleum stock is higher than what we assumed in the empirical analysis above, the price of 
petroleum is reduced relative to the price of biofuels. Consequently, fuel composition shifts away 
from first-generation biofuels towards petroleum. Furthermore, the adoption of second-generation 
biofuels is delayed by ten years relative to the baseline scenario, because the relatively lower price of 
transportation energy means that it takes longer before second-generation biofuels become cost 
competitive. With an increased consumption of the most carbon intensive resource, direct carbon 
emissions rise. However, indirect carbon emissions decrease in response to a decline in first-
generation biofuels production, which limits the effect on total emissions somewhat.  
Finally, by assuming a lower elasticity of substitution between first-generation biofuels and 
petroleum, the consumption of first-generation biofuels increases at the expense of petroleum. As a 
result, both direct and indirect carbon emissions increase. The relative increase in consumption of 
first-generation biofuels is seen to be considerable when the elasticity of substitution is reduced, but 
the impact on other predictions reported in the table is still small. The other scenarios we consider 
in the sensitivity analysis also yield results that are relatively similar to the baseline scenario, which 
suggest that our main empirical findings are robust: none of our main conclusions changes even if 
important model parameters are changed considerably. 
5  Conclusion 
The purpose of the study was to analyze future long term energy choices for transportation and the 
impact of biofuels policies on energy and food markets. This was done by developing and calibrating 
a model based on a Ricardian model of land use coupled with an extended Hotelling model of fossil 
fuel production. With the depletion of petroleum, the price of petroleum increases and makes 
biofuels economically viable. At the same time there is an increase in food needs in Medium and 
Low Income Economies. The increase in food demands and an expected shift from vegetarian 33 
 
towards meat and dairy products are expected to result in substantial increases in the demand for 
and opportunity cost of land. This puts pressure both on food and biofuels prices. In this context of 
land and petroleum scarcity, second-generation biofuels, which is the technology we consider as the 
backstop, are projected to be adopted in 2030 if there are no biofuels policies (scenarios A.i and B.i); 
earlier when biofuels targets are implemented. Second-generation biofuels are first adopted by 
OECD countries. By 2055, 30% of transportation energy will be provided by alternative renewable 
energy (first-and-second-generation biofuels). However, despite the shift towards cleaner energy 
sources, transportation is projected to release substantial amounts of carbon into the atmosphere 
over the next five decades. We find that world emissions of carbon will increase by 180% from 2005 
until 2055. Carbon emissions in Medium and Low Income Economies are projected to exhibit that 
fastest growth.  
Our results emphasize that the availability of marginal lands is crucial for the development in food 
prices. If marginal lands cannot be put into production, we observe that the food price increases 
twice as fast over the period 2005-2030 than if marginal lands can be converted into farmlands. 
Hence, marginal lands are projected to play an important role in dampening the expected increase in 
food prices. Biofuels policies are, on the contrary, not expected to have any big impact on food 
prices. The policies affect food prices, but the increase in the food price index when introducing 
biofuels targets in the European Union and the United States is, at most, projected to be moderate. 
This is in contrast to what has been reported in previous studies. The difference compared to our 
results can be explained by non-land using second-generation biofuels. Contrary to previous studies 
that have focused exclusively on first-generation biofuels, we also model the production and use of 
second-generation biofuels. Since first-generation biofuels require land, increased production of 
these biofuels increases the opportunity cost of land, which, in turn, increases the price of food. 
With second-generation biofuels, this negative effect on food prices through land competition 
between food and fuel does not occur. 
Biofuels policies significantly affect energy choices across regions as well as carbon emissions. 
Introducing a biofuels target in one region has considerable impact on energy choice in this region, 
but also in other regions through the increase in the price of biofuels relative to petroleum. This is 
the carbon leakage effect. Still, introducing biofuels policies tend to reduce total world emissions. 
However, if marginal lands are available, biofuels policies have the additional effect of causing more 34 
 
land to be converted into farmland, which releases sequestered carbon into the atmosphere; indirect 
carbon emissions. Taking indirect emissions into account, the total effect of mandatory blending in 
Europe and/or the United States on world carbon emissions is increased emissions. 
Compared to the previous literature, we find that the backstop technology, second-generation 
biofuels, becomes economically viable earlier. Our analysis suggests that second-generation biofuels 
become cost competitive around 2030. In contrast, Peña (2008) conclude that the backstop will not 
be competitive until 2040. The difference can be explained by the fact that we explicitly take into 
account the competition for scarce land resources between food and fuel. Increased competition for 
land causes the opportunity cost of land to increase and increases the competitiveness of second-
generation biofuels relative to land-using first-generation biofuels. 
There are several ways to extend the current work. First, results from the different scenarios 
highlight an increasing trend in food prices or, at the very least, a slowdown in the rate of decrease 
of food prices. Over recent decades, investment in R&D in agriculture has dwindled. Empirical 
work suggests that the level of agricultural productivity is related to food prices; the higher the food 
prices, the higher the level of R&D investment, and the higher is the agricultural productivity. This 
could be implemented in our model by making agricultural productivity a function of food prices. 
Second, most countries impose several forms of trade restrictions on both feedstock and biofuels 
with preferential waivers of tariffs and quotas for certain countries. Modeling the impacts of global 
trade in biofuels for the environment and especially for climate would be a possible area of future 
research. Finally, the model can be extended by making learning-by-doing effects in the use of 
second-generation biofuels endogenous. In the current model, the efficiency improvement in this 
technology over time is exogenous, which may bias our results toward under estimating the benefits 
of using the backstop technology. 
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Appendix A:  EMPIRICAL MODEL  
A detailed representation of the empirical model illustrated in Erreur  ! Source du renvoi 
introuvable. is presented below. There are two final food products in the model; a vegetarian 
product and a meat and dairy product. In addition fuels for transportation are supplied. Energy 
services for transportation may be provided by a blend of oil and first or second-generation biofuels. 
Land resources, which are categorized by land quality, may be allocated to pastures or to crops. 
Whereas pastures are exclusively used to produce meat and dairy products, crops may be allocated to 
feed production used in the meat and dairy production, the production of food crops, or to produce 
energy crops. The model accounts for direct and indirect carbon emissions. Finally, both food 
products and the three energy resources (oil, first-generation biofuels and second-generation 
biofuels) are traded between five regions; the United States, the European Union, other OECD 
countries, Medium Income Economies, and Low Income Economies. The model is described in 
more detail in the following. Notice that all variables are functions of time, but for convenience we 
omit the time index where this does not cause confusion. The model has been calibrated over the 
five year period 2000-2005. 
A.1  Regions  
The world is divided into five regions, USA, European Union, other OECD countries Medium and 
Low Income Economies. USA and European Union are characterized as two explicit regions since 
our study focus on the impact of US and EU mandatory blending policies on world agricultural and 
energy markets as well as on carbon emissions. Medium and Low Income countries are categorized 
according to their 2007 gross national income (GNI) per capita based on the World Bank Atlas 
Method. Table A. 1 shows the annual average GNI per capita. The level or range over the reference 39 
 
period (2000-2005) is shown in the second column while the third column shows the representative 
countries within each region.  
Table A. 1: Classification of model regions 
Regions  Annual average GNI per 
capita (2000-2005)  Main countries 
United States  42,040  - 
European Union  36,000  - 
Other OECD countries  33,000   
Medium Income Economies  US$ 936 - 11,455  Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia 
China , India 
Low Income Economies  Below US $ 935  Africa 
 
Regional GNI per capita increases exogenously over time at a decreasing rate. Initial population 
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where 
r
f d  is regional demand expressed in billion tons,  f P  is the price of commodity  f  in US$, 
r
f α  is the regional own-price elasticity of product  f , 
r
f β  is the regional income elasticity for 40 
 
product  f , 
r y  is the regional per capita income and N  is the regional population. 
r
f A  is the 
constant demand parameter calibrated from the data. To take into account changes in dietary habits, 
the income elasticity is not fixed over time, but changes with per capita income. 
 
A.3  Energy sector 
Primary energy may be provided by three different resources: oil, first-generation biofuels and 
second-generation biofuels. Primary energy resources are indexed by k . 
Each region is endowed with an initial stock of petroleum denoted by 
r S . Data on stock availability 
are extracted from the annual survey of the World Energy Council (WEC 2007). Petroleum is an 
input in several sectors in addition to transportation, such as the chemical industry and heat 
generation (IEA 2007, IFP 2007). The French Institute for Petroleum study indicates that 50% of 
extracted petroleum is used in transportation (IFP 2007). As a result, we only consider 50% of total 
petroleum reserves as the resource stock available for transportation.
24 To take into account the 
heterogeneity of petroleum reserves, regional extraction costs depend on the cumulative amount of 
petroleum extracted at date T . Thus, extraction costs can be expressed as follows (Nordhaus and 





























= ∑ is the cumulative 








≤ ∑ . The 
parameter 
r
1 ξ  is the extraction cost over the base period, and 
r
2 ξ  and 
r
3 ξ  are regional parameters. 
                                                 
24 This assumption may be criticized since the bulk of increase in energy demand will come from transportation 
(IEA, 2007). Thus, this share is expected to increase.  41 
 
The parameters are calibrated using data from the SAUNER model database (European 
Commission 2000) and reported in Table A.2. Then, petroleum is converted into gasoline or diesel, 
the coefficient of conversion is uniform across the different region as well as the conversion cost. 
Thanks to technical progress, conversion cost decreases by 5% every five years.  
 
Table A. 2. Petroleum stock characteristics 
Extraction cost parameter 
 
Available stock  
(billion gallons) 
1 ξ   2 ξ  
3 ξ  
USA 42,769  0.01817  100  5 
EU 10,461  0.01817  100  5 
Other OECD countries  56,974  0.01817  100  5 
Medium Income Economies  62,160  0.01817  100  5 
Low Income Economies  12,894  0.01817  100  5 
 Sources: Resources stock (WEC, 2007), extraction costs (European Commission, 2000; Chakravorty et al. 
2009). 
First-generation biofuels 
There are two main types of land-based fuels: bio-diesel and bio-ethanol. Currently, ethanol 
production represents 90% of first-generation biofuels at the world level. A representative feedstock 
is assigned to each region based on current production. First-generation biofuels in the United States 
are mainly produced from corn. In the Europe Union, the representative feedstocks are sugar beet 
and rapeseed. Brazil is the largest producer among Medium Income Economies; hence, sugar cane is 
used as the representative feedstock in this region. In Low Income Economies, first-generation 
biofuels are produced from cassava although current production levels are relatively low (FAO 
2008). The next step is to combine this with information on crop yields and the coefficient of 
transformation of crop into energy, obtained from FAO (2008). Finally, conversion cost of primary 
crop into final energy is extracted from Rajagopal and Zilberman (2007). Conversion costs from 42 
 
feedstock to biofuels are assumed to decrease by 5% every five years. Information on first-
generation biofuels is summarized in Table A. 3. 
 
Table A. 3. First-generation biofuels characteristics 











USA Corn  105  1.52  0.51 
EU  Sugar beet, 
rapeseed  305 1.04 0.6 
Other OECD 
countries  Corn, wheat  100  1.52   
Medium Income 
Economies  Sugarcane 405  1.04  0 
Low Income 
Economies  Cassava 100  1.52  0 
Sources: Conversion coefficient (FAO 2008), cost of conversion (Rajagopal and Zilberman 2007), subsidy 
(Von Lampe 2006). 
 
Second-generation biofuels 
OECD (2008) distinguishes between three categories of second-generation biofuels based on what 
the fuel is produced from: dedicated crops, agricultural residues and non-agricultural residues. 
First, dedicated crops that provide cellulose for ethanol or biomass for Fischer-Tropsch synthesis 
fuel are often, but not always, produced on land that can be alternatively used for food or feed 
production, and hence have the potential to negatively impact the supply of these products. 
However, for simplicity and without loss of generality, we adopt the same specification as in the 
OECD model and assume that this group is non-land using (OECD 2008). Then, agricultural 
                                                 
25 The cost of conversion is defined based on the cost of land, which is endogenous in the model.  43 
 
residues such as straw or stover can be used to produce ethanol via gasification or other biofuels 
such as Fischer-Trospch. Finally, biofuels from non-agricultural residues include biodiesel from 
cooking oil, synthesis from municipal wastes or algae, ethanol from forest residues, and wood chips, 
and other forms of organic matter that have no link to agricultural production.  
Despite the diversity of these technologies, all second-generation biofuels are treated as one in the 
model. The initial cost, which is an aggregate cost, amounts to US$ 5 per gallon (Ryan et al. 2006). In 
addition, since these technologies are still at the stage of research and development, a capacity 
constraint is imposed. 
Energy production is represented as the sum of i) a convex linear combination of petroleum and 
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where 
r
k θ  is the share of resource k, which is calibrated from observed data, ρ  is the elasticity of 
substitution, and 
r
k q  is the input demand for resource k. The elasticity of substitution is region 
specific and depends upon the technological barriers in each region. In High Income Economies, 
this value reaches 2. In Medium Income Economies, it is 1.85 and finally, and in Low Income 
Economies the value is 1.5.    
 
Land classes 
USDA’s database divides the global land surface into nine land classes based on climate and soil 
properties (Wiebe 2003). Land types are classified according to their suitability for agricultural 
production. Since we only consider productive land, land classes unsuitable for agricultural 
production, i.e., land classes VII to IX, are disregarded in the study. Then, the six remaining land 
classes are aggregated based on their characteristics. The USDA land classes I and II are grouped 
and referred to as land class I in our study, USDA land classes III and IV are grouped and referred 
to as land class II, and, finally, USDA land classes V and VI are grouped and renamed land class III. 44 
 
Hence, we end up with three land classes that we index using i = {I, II, III}. Land class I benefits 
from a long growing season and soil of good quality, land class II has a shorter growing season due 
to water stresses or too high or too low temperatures. Land class III is of the lowest quality. Each 
land class may be allocated to cropland or pastures. Let u denote the land-use index, where u = {crop, 
pastures}. 
Total supply from a specific use is represented by a Leontieff production function; it is the product 
of land supply and yield, as in most partial equilibrium model. Let us denote by  ,
r
iu k  the agricultural 
yield on land class i allocated to use u  in region r . Data on initial crop yields are extracted from 
FAOSTAT. Exogenous technical progress is assumed to improve land quality. However, annual 
growth rates will be steadily declining over the century (FAO 2005, 2008; Rosegrant et al. 2001). 
Hence, world primary crop yields are expected to increase by 50% and 75%, respectively, over the 
next five decades and the century (Rosegrant et al. 2001).  
Total primary production cost with respect to use u  in region r is defined by: 
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u and , 2 , 1 η η  are specific 
regional parameters with respect to use u .  They are calibrated using so-called Positive Mathematical 
Programming (Howitt 1995). Primary production costs can be extracted from GTAP and they are 
defined from the cost of land for different products and for different regions.  
Finally, an additional 1,600 million hectares of lands would be potentially suitable for crop 
production (FAO 2008), most of which is found in Latin America and Africa (see Table A. 4 below).
 
26  This land is located in Medium and Low Income Economies and belongs to land classes II and 
III. 
 
                                                 
26 Protected forestlands have been excluded (FAO 2008).  45 
 
Table A. 4. Marginal lands availability by land class and region (in million hectares) 
  Class I  Class II  Class III 
United States  No land available  No land available  No land available 
European Union  No land available  No land available   No land available 
Other OECD 
countries 
No land available  No land available   No land available 
Medium Income 
Economies 
No land available  300  500 
Low Income 
Economies 
No land available  200  600 
Source: FAO (2008)  
 
A.4  Carbon emissions 
The model accounts for direct and indirect carbon emissions.  
Direct carbon emissions 
The carbon emissions combined with the production and use of the three energy sources differ. The 
stage at which carbon emissions occur also differs between energy sources. Whereas the majority of 
carbon emissions related to petroleum are released in the atmosphere during the consumption 
phase, the majority of carbon related to biofuels is emitted into the atmosphere during the 
production stage. Table A.5 shows the carbon contents of the different energy sources. The carbon 
content of petroleum is independent of where it is consumed, while the carbon content of first and 
second-generation biofuels differs across regions. As an example, the production of sugar-based 
ethanol is less carbon intensive than corn ethanol. 
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Table A.5: Carbon contents of the different resources (tons of carbon per gallon).  




USA 0.0032  0.0017  0.0002 
EU 0.0032  0.0017  0.0002 
Other OECD 
countries  0.0032 0.0017 0.0002 
Medium Income 
Economies  0.0032 0.0004 0.0002 
Low Income 
Economies  0.0032 0.0017 0.0002 
Sources: Farell (2006) and Lasco and Khanna (2009). 
 
Indirect carbon emissions 
Biofuels offer carbon savings depending on how they are produced. Converting forest or grasslands 
in to farmland to produce food or energy crops releases sequestered carbon back into the 
atmosphere. This is referred to as indirect carbon emissions. Table A.6 reports the amount of 
carbon released in the atmosphere after land conversion. 
 
Table A.6: Amount of carbon released in the atmosphere after land conversion (tons of carbon per 
hectare). 
  Class I  Class II  Class III 
USA, EU and Other 
OECD countries 
No land available  No land available  No land available 
Medium-income 
countries 
No land available  300  500 
Low-income 
countries 
No land available  300  500 
Sources: Searchinger et al. (2008). 